This decade has witnessed a steep hike in the use of deceptive and manipulative design techniques, broadly referred to as dark patterns. The purpose of such patterns is to play on consumer biases and coax consumers into decisions that they may not have otherwise taken, especially where such decisions entail negative consequences. To address this concern, there has been development of laws which prohibit the usage of dark patterns, including consumer, advertising and data protection laws. However, the jurisprudence in this regard is piecemeal. Dark patterns are an intrinsic feature of digital markets, and competition authorities too are addressing such practices, without calling them out as dark patterns. In this paper the authors conduct a cross jurisdictional examination of laws regulating dark patterns and point out the need for specific competition law regulation of dark patterns in India.
The global digital markets are stimulating traditional market competition frameworks. This is with respect to the algorithmic systems empowering innovative methods of coordination andexclusion in the digital markets. The present research is an attempt to inspects the economic aspect underlying the same. Numerous studies reveals that algorithmic pricing system are selfreliant in achieving coordinated results. Evidences from global enforcement cases have shown the use of selfpreferencing practices through gametheory. The current Google Shoppingdecision, RealPage investigation, by the U.S. Department of Justices and the Competition Commission of Indias ongoing AmazonFlipkart investigation reveals selfpreferencing practices as a threat to consumer surplus. This paper attempts to throws light on the trials faced by the oldschool competition law frameworks. Moreover, this research explores about competitive injury upon selfreinforcing market dynamics. Besides, with Indias Draft Digital Competition Bill 2024 offering expected global trends, this research delves to evaluate hybrid amalgamation with traditional execution of algorithmic pricing. At the end the study concludes the need of constructive policy, enabling disclosure abilities and calibrating the legal standards which protects novelty in rapidly emerging digital economies.