Tags: Keywords: Right to Privacy, Data Protection, Sri Krishna Committee, Coase theorem, game theory, costs and incentives
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Set to become the most populated country, India has always lacked an adequate legal frameworkfor protecting the data privacy of its citizens
The following research paper, takes the assistance of secondary research to delve into the economic analysis of the Bill and how it strategically contradicts the purpose and objective of its creation that is – data privacy protection. Through adoption of Coase theorem and game theory, this paper seeks to elaborate on the provisions of the Bill and how they lack an appropriate economic trade-off for most individuals involved. Right to privacy was deemed a fundamental right in 2017 itself, and the project outlines the disruption of this Apex Court judgement from an economic point of view.
Acharaj Kaur Tuteja and Digvijay Singh (2025) "Data Protection in India: Privacy, Personal Data and the Saga of a Legislative and Economical Approach", GNLU Journal of Law And Economics : Volume VI 2023, Issue II
Available at:
https://gnlu.ac.in/GJLE/Publications/Data Protection in India: Privacy, Personal Data and the Saga of a Legislative and Economical Approach
The essay examines the violence that unfurled in Bangladesh in 2024 from the lens of the relativedeprivation theory to explain the role of perceived inequality in political violence, and the prospecttheory to explain the role of prospect losses as a motivation for individuals to participate inpolitical violence. The essay analyses the events that acted as a trigger for the social unrest andfocuses on the contentious quota to explain the decisionmaking process of the players involved,from the viewpoint of the prospect theory. The essay also looks at macroeconomic variables suchas youth unemployment, inflation etc. during both the years that marked a social unrest among thegeneral population and found that in both years, the economy had shown worrying trends. Theessay also looks at the role of costs and benefits as perceived by an individual while making achoice in a risky situation. The conceptual framework is further demonstrated by a game wherethe decisionmaking process of the government, as a player, is discussed. It is found that theequilibrium for both the players is at the first outcome, where the participation is met withsuppression by the government. The most ideal outcome for both the parties is a peaceful approachto the issue at hand. Based on the existing research, and the game theory, policy recommendationshave been formulated emphasizing the need for a stronger penal system, to augment the costs thatare associated with participation in violence, and to make infrastructural developments to addressthe socioeconomic issues at hand. The establishment of transparent communication channelswould also go a long way in mitigating the risks of future unrest.