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Tags: Keywords: Economics of crime, Punishment, Deterrence, WhiteCollar Crime

An Empirical Analysis of the Applicability of Beckers Model of Crime: A Case Study of Rape, Traffic Violations and Corruption in India

  • By Chinmayee Hegde and Anuradha S Pai
  • 6 Months ago
  • Downloads: 1

  • View: 49

Volume VI 2023 Issue II GNLU Journal of Law And Economics

The basis of the entire legal system, since time immemorial, is shrouded in the ideals of justice.Crime attracts Punishment.

Different jurists have proposed multiple theories of punishment in Jurisprudence. Most societies across the world today follow a punishment model that is a mixture of reformative theory and deterrent theory. The reformative model includes rehabilitation and community service. These activities help the wrongdoer in analysing their mistakes and becoming a better person. While, imprisonment, the death penalty and penalties or fines imposed on the wrongdoer deter them from committing the crime again and also deter other members of society from committing such an act. In some cases, the guilty are sentenced to a particular prison time and also asked to pay penalties or fines to the court or compensation to the victim. This is where the economic approach to particular crime factors in


Recommended Citation

Chinmayee Hegde and Anuradha S Pai (2025) "An Empirical Analysis of the Applicability of Beckers Model of Crime: A Case Study of Rape, Traffic Violations and Corruption in India ", GNLU Journal of Law And Economics : Volume VI 2023, Issue II
Available at: https://gnlu.ac.in/GJLE/Publications/An Empirical Analysis of the Applicability of Beckers Model of Crime: A Case Study of Rape, Traffic Violations and Corruption in India

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